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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EVIDENCE
-POWER OF JUDGE TO COMMENT
UPON EVIDENCE. - [Illinois] The
defendant was found guilty of lar-
ceny in stealing an automobile, and
was sentenced to the penitentiary.
A writ of error was sworn out to
reverse the judgment on the grounds
that the trial judge, in his charge
to the jury, commented upon the
evidence and orally instructed the
jury as to the law in the case. Held:
on appeal, that these acts of the
judge were prohibited by the Prac-
tice Act: Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill,
1931) ch. 110, secs. 72, 73. Judg-
men4 reversed: People v. Kelly
(1931) 347 Ill. 221, 179 N. E. 898.
(Rehearing denied Feb. 3, 1932.)
The decision of the lower court
was reversed on the theory that
the judge had violated provisions
in the Practice Act which state
that the court in charging the jury
shall only instruct as to the law
of the case, and that such instruc-
tions shall be reduced to writing:
Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1931), ch.
110, secs. 72, 73. These enactments
were held to be constitutional and
not to infringe upon the right of
trial by jury as enjoyed at com-
mon law. It is submitted, however,
that these provisions, which forbid
the judge to express his opinion on
the evidence and require written in-
"structions to be given to the jury,
may not only encroach upon the
NEWMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
right of trial by jury as enjoyed at
common law, but also may be un-
constitutional.
It is generally conceded in Illi-
nois that "trial by jury" relates to
the practice in vogue under the
common law: People v. Bruner
(1931) 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E. 400;
Sinopoli v. Chicago Ry. Co. (1925)
316 Il1. 609, 147 N. E. 487. The
State Constitution provides that the
right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate, and
the constitutions of 1818 and 1848
import the same meaning in similar
language: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 2,
sec. 5; 1818, Art. 8, sec. 6; 1848,
Art. 13. The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the right of trial
by jury is the right as it existed
at common law and at the time of
the adoption of the respective con-
stitutions: Liska v. Chicago, Ry.
Co. (1925) 318 111. 570, 147 N. E.
487.
At common law it was the duty
of the judge to sum up the evidence
on both sides of a case, assist the
jury by commenting upon the evi-
dence in their presence, with the
reservation that the ultimate deter-
mination of the issue wofld f6e left
with the jurors: 3 Blackstone
"Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land" (Cooley Ed. 1884) 373, 374;
2 Hale "The History of the Com-
mon Law" (Runnington Ed. 1794)
147; Scott "Trial by Jury and the
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Reform of Civil Procedure" (1918)
13 Harv. L. Rev. 669; Solarte v.
Melville (1827) 7 B. & C. 430, 1
M. & R. 198 Lincoln v. Power
(1893) 151 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct.
387. In the United States, the
first deviation from the common
law rule occurred in North Caro-
lina in 1796 when a statute was
passed forbidding the judge to com-
ment upon the evidence in a trial.
In other states statutes were en-
acted, constitutions were amended,
or the courts rendered judicial de-
cisions prohibiting the judge to ex-
ecute this common law duty: John-
son "Province of the judge in Jury
Trials" (1928) 12 Jour. of Am. Jud.
Soc. 76; for history of jury devel-
opment, see Sunderland "The In-
efficiency of the American Jury"
(1915) 13 Mich. L. Rev. 307; For-
syth "History of Trial by Jury"
(1876). The common law practice
was abrogated in many cases be-
cause of the acts of one or several
judges, or because of enmity be-
tween.the legislature and the bench:
Jolpnson- "Province of the Judge in
Jury Trials" supra; for Illinois
historical sketch see Cartwright
"Present But Taking No Part"
(1916) 10 Ill. L. Rev. 537.
In the instant case, the court ad-
mits that the essential requirements
of the right of trial by jury are
(1) twelve (2) impartial (3) quali-
fied jurors, who should (4) unani-
mously decide the facts in contro-
versy; (5) under the direction and
superintendence of a judge. At
common law, "under the direction
and superintendence of a judge"
included his duty to give the jurors
assistance by weighing the evidence
before them: 2 Hale "History of
the Common Law," supra, It seems
that this construction of the com-
mon law practice is more tenable
than the theory employed by the
court in holding that the constitu-
tional provision retains the "sub-
stance" and not the particular meth-
od and procedure known to the
common law trial by jury. The
suggested construction of the com-
mon law practice is supported by
decisions in several jurisdictions,
where, incidentally, the constitutional
provisions pertaining to trial by
jury are similar to those in Illinois:
New Jersey Const. 1844, Art. 1,
sec. 7; Merklinger v. Lambert
(1909) 76 N. J. L. 806, 72 Atl. 119;
New York Const. 1894, Art. 7, sec.
2; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt (1891) 128
N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651.
The sections of the Illinois Prac-
tice Act, on which the court relies
in rendering the decision in the
instant case, encroach upon the
fundamental principle of the divi-
sion of the powers of government
into legislative, executive and judi-
cial departments: Ill. Const., 1870,
Art. 3. The legislature, in decree-
ing that the judge shall not com-
ment upon the evidence in a trial
and that his instructions shall be
in writing, is clearly transgress-
ing the domain of the judiciary.
The General Assembly is forbidden
to pass local or special laws regu-
lating the practice in courts of jus-
tice: Ill. Const., 1870, Art. 4, sec.
22. If any implication of legisla-
tive power to enact such statutes
is to be found in this provision, it
is covered by the article which
states that either department is for-
bidden to exercise any other de-
partment's powers except as "here-
inafter expressly directed and per-
mitted": Ill. Const., 1870, Art. 3.
It is axiomatic, that the courts can-
not dictate to the legislature what
methods of practice or procedure it
must follow; and yet we have the
anomalous situation where the high-
est tribunal of the state sanctions
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legislative dictation of court prac-
tices. The legislature exceeds its
constitutional power when it at-
tempts to impose upon the judiciary
any rules for the dispatch of the
judiciary's duties: Wigmore "All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary
Procedure Are Void Constitution-
ally" (1928) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276.
The principle enunciated in this
case may be questioned on the
ground that it retards the efficient
administration of justice. The re-
ported experience of many trial
lawyers fortifies the theory that the
return to the orthodox common law
rule would aid greatly in the dis-
pensation of justice. To permit
the presiding judge to express his
opinion concerning the weight of
the evidence would make of him
more than an umpire and constitu-
tional arbiter while on the bench.
Less time and a minimum of ex-
pense would be required in im-
panelling a jury: "The Law of
Evidence" (Committee, Common-
wealth Fund, 1927) 21. The intro-
duction of evidence would be facili-
tated. The judge would be able to
exercise much more effective con-
trol over the conduct of the trial.
It would simplify the task of in-
structing the jury on the law. Few
reforms would have so wide reach-
ing and wholesome effect in pro-
moting efficiency of courts and im-
proving the quality of justice ob-
tainable there, as a return to the
common law rule of permitting the
judge to comment on and weigh
the evidence, and to instruct the
jury orally on points of law when
necessary. Sunderland "The Inef-




[Ohio] The defendant was prose-
cuted for presenting false vouchers
to county officials, the trial extend-
ing over a period of two weeks. The
jury had been considering the case
for more than twenty-four hours
when it was brought back into open
court by the order of the judge
and was instructed as follows: "It
seems to me that the failure of this
jury to agree upon verdicts in this
case must be due to the fact that
some of you are permitting your-
selves to be influenced by matters
extraneous to and outside of the
evidence of the case. The trial of
this case has been lengthy and a
very expensive thing to this com-
munity and no member of this panel
should refuse to join with his fel-
low jurors in a verdict on each of
these indictments for any trivial or
personal reason or consideration
not arising from the evidence or
the lack of evidence in the case.
You have heard all the testimony
and examined all the exhibits in
the case, and under the instructions
I have given you as to the law ap-
plicable herein you either are or
are not convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt of the truth of the
charges made in these indictments.
Whichever is the fact you should
say so. You are all members of
the regular jury panel of this court,
and if you are unable to agree in
this case after all the consideration
of it you would be unable to agree
in any case and your further ser-
vice as members of this panel would
not only be useless but a waste of
time and money to the litigants and
the citizens of this community. I
am now sending you out again for
the further consideration of the
case and I feel certain if you con-
fine yourselves to the evidence and
the law as I have given it to you
you will have no difficulty in agree-
ing upon verdictd as to each of
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these indictments." The defendant
was found guilty, and he appealed,
claiming that he was deprived of
an impartial jury trial by reason of
this instruction. Held: that the
judgment be reversed and the case
remanded, on the ground that the
charge given by the trial court
coerced the jury to return this ver-
dict: Zimmerman v. State (Ohio
1932) 182 N. E. 354.
The reviewing court, it must be
remembered, basing its decision on
the record, has no means of know-
ing the manner in which the in-
structions were given in the lower
court. Thus instructions apparently
coercive according to their written
content actually may be mild and
iiieffective. On the other hand, in-
structions which appear merely sug-
gestive and advisory and in no way
forceful, may be coercive when
articulated by the judge. One
writer tells of a distinguished mem-
ber of the bench whose custom it
had been to deliver instructions so
drastic in nature that a defendant
rarely escaped conviction, and yet
the cases were never reversed. The
record would show that the judge
had charged: "If [scornfully] you
believe the defendant's testimony
you will of course acquit him. He
is presumed [with a shrug of the
shoulders] to be innocent until the
contrary is. proved. If you have
[another shrug] any reasonable
doubt as to his guilt, you must give
him the benefit of it. On the other
hand, if you accept the testimony
offered in behalf of the People, you
may and WILL Convict him!" (The
last few words in tones of thunder.)
Train "Prisoner at the Bar" (1908)
p. 179.
In the early days coercion of ver-
dicts was not an unusual occur-
rence and it generally has become
the practice in this country that
the court may properly admonish
the jury as to the importance of
coming to a verdict, but care should
be taken not to suggest what ver-
dict is proper, nor to give instruc-
tions having a tendency to coerce
the jury into agreeing'on a verdict:
People v. Becker (1915) 215 N. Y.
126, 109 N. E. 127; Spick v. State
(1909) 140 Wis. 104, 121 N. W.
664. Where the facts show a clear
case of coercion, the courts have
not hesitated to reverse and remand
the cause: Quong Duck v. U. S.
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923) 293 Fed. 563
(where the judge instructed the
jury that he could not understand
why verdict was not promptly ren-
dered and that in his opinion the
case was one where a verdict ought
to be reached) ; Kendrick v. State
(1930) 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S. W.
(2d) 859 ("I held one jury one
time here for six days and they
agrecd. I have never started out
with a jury that they didn't
agree.") ; Palmer v. State (1873)
50 Ala. 154 (The judge told the,
jury that he would keep the court
open until they did agree; that they
had nothing to do but to find de-
fendant guilty.)
It may be clear in other instances
that there has been no coercion to
any degree, but merely an admoni-
tion as to the importance of coming
to a verdict: Israel v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 6th, 1925) 3 F. (2d) 743.
(Although the court expressed re-
gret because of the jury's inability
to reach a verdict, he hoped that
they might be able to reconcile their
individual views, but never desired
to coerce any juror to decide against
his own conscience) ; People v. Quon
Foi (Cal. App. 1922) 206 Pac. 1028.
("Your exclusive province is to
judge the facts, but I wish to im-
press the advisability of coming to
your conclusion, and rendering a
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verdict. I sincerely trust that with
further consideration of this case,
you will be able to agree upon some
form of verdict.")
Somewhere between these two ex-
tremes cases arise in which a rea-
sonable person may differ in de-
ciding whether there has or has not
been coercion in the particular
case: Stewart v. U. S. (C. C. A.
8th, 1924) 300 Fed. 769. (Instruc-
tion to jury that the court desired
in no wise to influence them at all
in respect to a verdict but simply
to emphasize the fact that if they
can consistently, and by consulta-
tion with each other reach a ver-
dict, and if a verdict can be con-
scientiously arrived at, it is highly
desirable-held erroneous); Con-
monwealth v. Tenbroeck (1919)
265 Pa. St. 251, 108 Atl. 635. ("You
must agree. It is your duty to
undertake to agree"-held proper);
Yancy v. State (Ga. 1931) 160 S.
E. 867. ("Mistrials are a serious
matter and in many ways hinder
justice"--held proper.)
Only one case has been found
which disposes of a situation sub-
stantially the same as that in the
principal cape, and it was there
held erroneous to threaten to dis-
charge the jury for failure to agree
on a verdict: People v. Strzemp-
kowski (1920) 211 Mich. 266, 178
N. W. 771.
It has been said that the trial
judge possesses very broad discre-
tion and that it needs a "pretty
plain case of prejulicial overstep-
ping of it" to constitute error:
Willard v. State (1928) 195 Wis.
170, 217 N. W. 651. The view also
has been advanced, that "it would
be startling to have such action held
to be error, and error sufficient to
reverse a judgment": Allis v. U. S.
(1894) 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup. Ct.
36. Some courts, however, have
expressly stated that "whether the
error is harmless or prejudicial de-
pends on the facts of the case":
People v. Volub (1929) 333 Ill. 554,
165 N. E. 196. Although this latter
proposition has not been stated
openly by the authorities in this
particular branch, except in a few
instances, it seems to provide a
convenient means by which a case
may be reversed and remanded, and
it leaves the way open for review-
ing courts to decide the question
either way depending upon their
version of the particular facts.
EDwARD S. ALTERSOHN.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - STATE'S
RIGHT TO APPEAL WHEN AN IN-
DICTMENT IS QUASHED.-[Illinois]
The ,defendant was indicted for
bigamy in the Criminal Court of
Cook County. The trial judge
quashed the indictment because it
failed to describe the parties or sub-
ject matter with sufficient certainty.
The state sued out a writ of error
to test the constitutionality of an
Illinois statute enacted in 1845
which prohibited the state from
appealing or applying for a writ of
error or new trial in a criminal
case: Il. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1931) ch. 38, sec. 747. Held: writ
of error dismissed: People v. Barber
(1932) 348 Ill. 40, 180 N. E. 633.
After upholding the constitu-
tionality of the statute involved and
arriving at the inescapable conclu-
sion that the state had nq right to
appeal because of its existence, the
court stated that any departure
from the present law must be legis-
lative and not judicial.
The question whether or not a
state may appeal in a criminal case
has been answered in a variety of
ways, covering practically every
possibility between the two ex-
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tremes." At common law, the state
could not appeal or sue out a writ
of error to review a judgment for
the defendant in a criminal case,
even on demurrer, much less on a
verdict of acquittal: Clark "Crim-
inal Procedure" (1895) 393. A
few jurisdictions, by judicial de-
cision, forbid appeals by the state
in all cases: State v. Johnson
(1920) 146 Minn. 468, 177 N. W.
657; Comm. v. Cummungs (Mass.
1849) 3 Cush. 212. In some in-
stances, courts have declined to con-
sidtr points raised by the state on
appeal taken by defendants: Pres-
cott v. State (1907) 52 Tex. Cr.
App. 35, 105 S. W. 192; Parks v.
State (1917) 21 Ga. App. 506, 94
S. E. 628. A few states permit ap-
peals by the prosecution only in
cases of major offenses: State v.
Adams (1920) 142 Ark. 411, 218
S. W. 845. Others allow it only in
cases of minor offenses: Comm. v.
Gritten (1918) 180 Ky. 446, 202
S. W. 884. Some jurisdictions, even
in the absence of statutes, allow
the state to appeal from a judgment
in favor of the defendant if it
was rendered prior to verdict: State
v. Buchanan (Md. 1821) 5 Harr. &
J. 317; Comm. v. Capp. (1864) 48
Pa. St. 53. Connecticut adopts the
view that jeopardy is a continuing
one from the beginning to the end
of the cause, and under a statute
giving the state the same right as
the accused to appeal on all ques-
tions of law arising in a criminal
case has held that even after an
acquittal the state may appeal, or
in case of a reversal may bring the
defendant into court again for a
new trial: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918)
sec. 6648; State v. Lee (1894) 65
Conn. 265, 30 Atd. 1110.
Jurisdictions which permit an ap-
peal by -the state vary as to when
this right shall be exercised. The
Federal Criminal Appeals Act per-
mits the government to appeal Dy
means of a writ of error from a
decision or judgment quashing, set-
ting aside or sustaining a demurrer
to any indictment where such de-
cision or judgment is based upon
the invalidity o4 construction of
the statute upon which the indict-
ment is founded: (1907) 34 Stat.
1246, 18 U. S. C. A. 682. In
twenty-three jurisdictions the state
is authorized by statute to appeal
from an order setting aside or sus-
taining a demurrer to an indict-
ment; some like Michigan, on the
same grounds as the Federal Act,
and others on more liberal grounds:
Am. L. Inst. Proposed Final Draft
of Code of Cr. Proc. (1930) 499.
This Federal practice, and tne
tendency of almost haif of the
states to allow on appeal by the
state upon the quashing of an in-
dictment, shows the need of mod-
ernizing the criminal procedure in
Illinois to the extent of permitting
the state to appeal upon the quash-
ing of an indictment when jeopardy
has not attached to the defendant,
when the statute on which the in-
dictment is founded has been de-
clared unconstitutional or because
of a formal defect in the indict-
ment itself. The practical desir-
ability of this reform already has
been realized: Am. L. Inst. Pro-
posed Final Draft of Code of Cr.
Pro., supra, sec. 440, p. 148.
A defendant is not put in jeopardy
by the mere reading of an indict-
ment, as jeopardy attaches only
when the accused has been ar-
raigned and the jury sworn and
impaneled: People v. O'Donnel
(1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N. E. 639.
Moreover, a nolle prosequi before
trial has commenced does not pre-
clude another indictment for the
same offense: Ibid. It would seem,
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then, that there is no good reasor
why the state should not be per-
mitted to appeal from a trial court
decision quashing an indictment.
Another argument in support of
removing this restraint upon the
prosecution may be found in the
words of Chief Justice Taft in his
comment upon the Federal Criminal
Appeals Act of 1907: "The reason
and policy of this statute is in the
need for expedition in securing a
final interpretation of new criminal
statutes by the court of last resort,
so that the government and those
charged with violating the new law
may have the earliest possible final
interpretation of what the new law
means, and long trials and convic-
tions, which might subsequently be
set aside because of a faulty inter-
pretation of the statute, may be
avoided. Expedition and uniform-
ity in construction are thus the con-
trolling considerations." Taft "The
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Under the Act of Feb. 13, 1925."
(1925) 35 Yale L. J. 1. This rea-
soning is equally applicable to a
statute allowing the state to appeal
upon the quashing of an indict-
ment.
Where an indictment is quashed
upon the ground that the statute
upon which it is founded is uncon-
stitutional and void, there is no
way under the existing law by
which the case can be appealed to
the highest! tribunal of the state
for a final decision upon its con-
stitutionality and, thus, whether the
trial court is right or wrong its de-
cisions become final: Comment
(1927) 3 Notre Dame Lawyer 45.
Though the rights of an accused
must be safeguarded religiously, yet
the legislature has a right, and not
only a right, but a duty to look to
the interest of the great body of
people. Thus by allowing the state
an appeal, an erroneous decision
may be corrected without in any
way infringing on the rights of the
defendant. To anticipate the ob-
jection that the state may by pro-
longing the appeal deny the de-
fendant a speedy and public trial
guaranteed by the Constitution, the
state could be made subject to the
usual time limits governing.any ap-
peal in criminal cases.
It is hoped that the legislature
will realize that the present statute
has outlived its usefulness, and will
bring Illinois into accord with the
more progressive states, by amend-
ing the present statute or enacting
another allowing the state to ap-
peal upon the quashing of an in-
dictment when jeopardy' has not
begun, and thus secure this much
needed modernization in the admin-
istration of criminal justice.
ALFRED J. CILELLA.
ACCESSORIES AFTER THE FACT-
PROSECUTION AFTER ACQUITTAL OF
ALLEGED PRINcIPAL.-[Kentucky] A
Kentucky statute provided that "ac-
cessories after the fact, not other-
wise punished, shall be guilty of
high misdemeanors-and may be
tried, though the principals be not
taken or tried": Carroll's Ky. Stat-
utes (1922) ch. 36, sec. 1129. The
Kentucky court in the instant case
held that the prior acquittal of the
alleged principal did not preclude
the prosecution of a defendant as
an accessory after the fact. Al-
though it is necessary in such a
prosecution to prove the guilt of
the principal, the prior acquittal of
the alleged principal is not res
judicata as to his innocence in the
subsequent prosecution of an ac-
cessory after the fact. This re-
sults from the established rule that
the prior conviction of the prin-
cipal does not preclude an alleged
accessory after the fact from-show-
:ing in a subsequent prosecution that
he is innocent: Kentucky v. Long
(Jan. 24, 1933, Kentucky Court of
Appeals) United States Daily, Feb.
9, 1933, p. 4.
The court in the instant case de-
parted from the common law. At
common law, an accessory, either
before or after the fact, could not
be convicted unless his. principal
had been convicted, or outlawed,
which was the, equivalent of con-
viction. -The one exception was
where the accessory consented to
be tried before the principal.
Therefore, the conviction of the
principal was one of the essential
elements in the trial of the acces-
sory. If both were tried together,
this remained true, for then the
jury were required,- first, to de-
termine the guilt of the principal,
and only upon so finding could they
consider the guilt of the accessory:
People v. Beintner (1918) 168 N.
Y. Supp. 945; 1 Brill "Cyclopedia
of Criminal Law" (1922) sec. 254.
In some states, where by statu-
tory provision those aiding and
abetting the performance of a
felony, or accessories before tne
fact, are made principals and may
be tried and convicted prior to the
trial and conviction of the prin-
cipal, it is held, nevertheless, that
a subsequent acquittal of the prin-
cipal will entitle the accessory to a
discharge: McCarty v. State (1873)
44 Ind. 214; State v. Jones (1888)
101 N. C. 719, 8 S. E. -147; Bowen
v. State (1889) 25 Fla. 645, 6 So.
459; for further discussion of the
effect of such statutory provisions
and a similar holding in Illinois as
to accessories before the fact, see
comment (1932) 24 JOURNAL OF
CRIMINAi LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY
107. However, in other jurisdic-
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tions, under similar statutory pro-
visions, the acquittal oJf the prin-
cipal defendant does not operate to
discharge the prior conviction of
the accessory nor to bar his sub-
sequent prosecution and conviction:
State v. Patterson (1893) 52 Kan.
335, 34 Pac. 784; Cummings v.
Commonwealth (1927) 221 Ky. 301,
298 S. W. 943; Rooney v. United
States (C. C. A. 9th, 1913) 203 Fed.
928; but cf. United States v. Crane
(C. C. Ohio, 1847) 4 McLean 317,
Fed. Cas. 14,888. The same result
logically is reached where the stat-
ute expressly provides that the ac-
quittal of the principal shall not bar
a prosecution against an accessory:
Gibson v. State (1908) 53 Tex.
Cr. 349, 110 S. W. 41. For further
discussion and authorities, see Sears
"Principals and Accessories" (1931)
25 Ill. Law Rev. 845.
Accessories after the fact often
are dealt with separately, by the
statutes, but where it is held that
accessories before the fact, who
frequently are considered as prin-
cipals, can or cannot be prosecuted
and convicted if the principal de-
fendant is acquitted the rule should
be the same for accessories after
the fact. At least, there do not
appear to be any cases to the con-
trary. In the instant case, the Ken-
tucky statute permitted the trial of
accessories after the fact, though
the principal had not been taken or
tried. In other states, under stat-
utes which went farther by permit-
ting the trial and conviction of an
accessory after the fact, whether
the principal had or had not been
convicted, and although he had been
pardoned or otherwise discharged
from conviction, it was 'held that
the acquittal of the principal did
not bar the conviction of an acces-
sory after the fact: People v. Beint-
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ner, supra; State v. Jones (1909)
91 Ark. 5, 120 S. W. 154.
The Kentucky court in the in-
stant case adhered to the common
law requirement of the proof of
the guilt of the principal in the
prosecution of the accessory. It is
generally held that the guilt of the
principal must be shown: 1 Brill
"Cyclopedia of Criminal Law"
(1922) sec. 253; Ray v. State
(1912) 102 Ark. 594, 145 S. W.
RR1: Pon te v. Jordan (1910) 244
Ill. 386, 91 N. E. 482; Rawlins v.
State (1905) 124 Ga. 31, 52 S. E.
1. This is true where the statute
allows the accessory to be tried be-
fore the conviction of the principal:
McMahon v. State (1910) 168 Ala.
70, 53 So. 89; Gibson v. State, supra.
The acquittal of the principal, how-
ever, was held by the instant case
not to be res judicata as to his in-
nocence in the subsequent prosecu-
tion of an accessory after the fact.
The authorities in this country seem
to be divided on the question of
the conclusiveness of the judgment
as to the principal defendant in the
trial of the accessory. Some courts
hold that a judgment of acquittal
as to the principal is conclusive
proof on the trial of the accessory
that the alleged principal did not
commit the crime charged: Ray v.
State (1882) 13 Neb. 55, 13 N. W.
2; State v. Haines (1899) 51 La.
Ann. 731, 25 So. 372. Another view
is that the judgment as to the prin-
cipal is prima facie proof, but is
not conclusive evidence of his guilt:
Commonwealth v. Minnich (1915)
250 Pa. 363, 95 Atl. 565. A third
holding, where the conviction or
acquittal of the principal is imma-
terial to the prosecuion and con-
viction of the accessory, is that
neither judgment is admissible in
the action against the accessory:
People v. Beintner, supra; State v.
Gargano (1923) 99 Conn. 103, 121
Atl. 657.
It is submitted that the instant
case may be indicative of a trend
toward a more complete and facile
administration of the criminal laws.
It is logically correct, perhaps, that
in order for one to be guilty as an
accessory after the fact there mus,
be a guilty principal. Tne prose-
cution of one as an accessory
though the alleged principal was ac-
quitted does not, it seems, neces-
sarily militate against this. An ac-
quittal might not result from ab-
sence of guilt since it is but the
verdict of one body of triers, and
may have been wrongfully obtained.
When the guilt of the principal is
shown upon the trial of the* acces-
sory, it appears that the logical re-
quirement' is satisfied. The com-
mon law affords a guilty accessory
the opportunity to thwart justice
should his equally guilty principal
evade conviction.
ROLAND W. SPANGENDiERG.
CONDUCT OF JUDGE -EXAMINA-
TION OF WITNESSES.-[Illinois] The
defendants were convicted of rob-
bery, after having waived trial by
jury. Upon appeal the defendants
alleged misconduct of the trial
judge as ground for reversal. It
was charged that the judge pro-
pounded more questions to the de-
fendant's alibi witnesses than did
the counsel for defense and prose-
cution combined. It was urged
further that the judge subjected the
witnesses to a severe cross-exam-
ination and showed hostility toward
them. Held: affirmed. The ex-
tent to which a judge may indulge
in the examination of witnesses
rests largely within his discretion,
although in the exercise of such
discretion he must not forget the
function of judge and assume that
of advocate. In this case the testi-
mony of the witnesses was patently
fabricated so that the judge had a
right to act as he did: People v.
Giacomino (1932) 347 Ill. 601, 180
N. E. 437.
The attitude of the American
courts toward freedom of the judge
in examining and cross-examining
witnesses finds its source deep
rooted in the English law. In the
time of Bracton, when the jurors
themselves were witnesses, the
judge exercised considerable con-
trol over them: Stephen "General
View of the Criminal Law of Eng-
land" (1863) 18. Bracton reported
that where a serious crime was in-
volved, and the jurors wished to
conceal it, the judge could separate
them and examine each one indi-
vidually so as to ascertain the truth
sufficiently: Bracton "De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae," Book 5,
Vol. 2 of 1879 reprint, ch. 22, sec.
3. Lord Chief Justice Ellenbor-
ough once remarked that to say the
judge on the bench may not put
what questions and in what form he
pleases can only originate in that
dullness and stupidity which is the
curse of the age: 25 Hansard Parl.
Deb. (1813) 207 1 Wigmore "Evi-
dence" (1904) sec. 784; 1 Chain-
berlayn "Modern Law of Evidence"
(1911) sec. 539. Today in Eng-
land the judge of his own volition
may put on the stand and examine
witnesses wilo are called neither
by the prosecution nor by the de-
fense. In order to clear up doubt-
ful points the judge often inter-
rogates witnesses during their ex-
amination by counsel, and he un-
ceremoniously terminates any at-
tempt on either side to substitute
confusion for common sense: How-
ard "Criminal Justice in England"
(1931) 376.
RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
In sharp contrast is the attitude
of appellate courts in the United
States, which fear that any inter-
cession by the judge will influence
a jury. The general rule is that a
trial judge has an undoubted right
to interrogate witnesses for the
purpose of developing the truth of
the matter at issue, and he likewise
has a discretion to determine when
a necessity or propriety therefor
exists. However this undoubted
right and this discretion are con-
strued quite strictly according to
the circumstances of each case:
Andrews v. Ketcham (1875) 77 Ill.
377, Sparks v. State (1877) 59
Ala. 82; Long v. State (1884) 95
Ind. 481; Gordon v. Irvine (1897)
105 Ga. 144, 31 S. E. 151; Jones
"Evidence" (1914) see. 815; 1
Wharton "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed. 1912) sec. 452; 1 Wigmore
"Evidence" (1904) sec. 784; 8
Encyclopedia of Pleading and Prac-
tice secs. 71-73; Bowers "Judicial
Discretion of Trial Courts" (1931)
sec. 399.
In Illinois it always has been
recognized that the judge has free-
dom in examination within the
bounds of his own discretion:
Foreman v. Baldwin (1860) 24 Ili.
299; Dunn v. People (1898) 172 Ill.
582, 50 N. E. 137; People v. Schultz
(1921) 301 Ill. 601, 133 N. E. 379;
People v. Rongetti (1928) 331 Ill.
581, 596, 163 N. E. 373. In each
of these cases it is to be noted that
the effect on the jury is the decid-
ing factor which limits the discre-
tion of the judge. Even the tone
or inflection of the voice of the
judge will indicate his opinion of
innocence or guilt of the defend-
ants, and for that reason it is felt
that instances are rare and condi-
tions exceptional which will justify
the presiding judge in entering
upon and conducting such an ex-
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amination. The exercise of a sound
discretion will seldom deem such
action necessary or advisable: Dunn
v. People, supra.; People v. Ron-
getti, supra; People V. Bernstein
(1911) 250 11. 63, 95 N. E. 50.
In deciding the instant case, which
was a trial by a judge alone, the
court cited only one authority on
the subject at issue, and that was
a case of trial by jury: People v.
Bernstein, supra. The court passed
over the distinction by saying that
the principle in the two cases is
the same. In view of the fact that
the presence of the jury has been
the predominating factor and has
had such a pronounced effect in
moulding and constricting the free-
dom of the judge and his discre-
tion, it is most difficult to see how
the absence of the jury leaves the
situation unaffected, or the applica-
tion of the rule unchanged. While
the court is consistent with prin-
ciple in upholding the judge iht the
instant case, the practice of apply-
ing a rule which grew up with jury
trial to a case in which the jury
is waived hardly seems logical.
The chief cause for restriction is
gone. With waiver of juries in-
creasing, and the resultant weight
of responsibility thrown upon the
judge, it seems desirable to ap-
proach more closely the .nglish
practice in regard to judicial free-
dom, and to expand proportion-
ately the previously strict con-
struction of such discretion.
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